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Summary
In this paper I discuss and make comparisons between two re-
lated texts which were both written by John Toland during the pro-
ductive period of his association with the Court of Sophie Char-
lotte, the Queen of Prussia. Between August and November 1702
he joined her intellectual circle, which included Gottfried Leibniz,
and was prominent in free discussions she encouraged about reli-
gious matters and relevant philosophical questions. The Queen
seems to have asked for written papers to be prepared and pre-
sented, sometimes on both sides of a controversy, and other manu-
scripts also passed between members of the circle. Some of the re-
sulting texts, including some of the exchanges between Toland and
Leibniz, have survived and their provenance is generally recog-
nized1. There are, however, surviving texts where this is not so, in-
cluding, though in different ways, the two letters of Toland dis-
cussed here.
One of these, which I refer to simply as the Remarques, takes the
form of a letter to the Queen attacking Leibniz’s metaphysical sys-
tem. It was published anonymously in 17162, when Leibniz con-
cluded it was not the work of Toland. The Remarques has been en-
tirely neglected so far by those who have attempted to expound
Toland’s thought and it has usually been omitted from bibliogra-
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phies of his work3. But recent scholarship puts Toland’s authorship
beyond doubt4. There has never been any doubt about the author-
ship of the other text I discuss, which is familiar to students of
Toland as the fifth and last of his Letters to Serena5. But its prove-
nance has remained a mystery. I identify “the noble Friend” to
whom it is addressed and its context in the discussions of some
members of the Queen’s circle. 
The evidence for attributing the Remarques to Toland depends
mostly upon a close comparison between these two letters, which
are found to overlap, particularly in the critique of the use of ab-
stract notions and of the extension of mathematical notions into
philosophy. Here I explore the overlap further, arguing that Letters
V was written first and that Toland effectively plagiarized parts of
it when drafting his critique of Leibniz. Nonetheless the addition
of the Remarques to the canon of his writings helps the interpreta-
tion of Toland’s thought during this period. It clarifies and enlarges
upon some of Toland’s most distinctive philosophical ideas. Even
where the two texts appear to differ a better interpretation may re-
sult from considering how they may be reconciled.
The paper concludes by considering a striking discrepancy be-
tween the comprehensive materialism apparently adopted in the
Remarques and the conclusion of Letters V that we need to admit a
“presiding Intelligence” that is responsible for the amazing degree
of organisation to be found in nature. I conclude by suggesting an
interpretation which reconciles the apparent theism of Letters V
with the materialism of the Remarques. I suggest that Toland did
not, even at this stage, subscribe to the “materialistic pantheism”
usually credited to him but already held the “dualistic pantheism”
of his later writings. 
1. Toland’s critique of Leibniz’s “New system”
The Remarques was written, according to the author, upon the
instruction of the Queen of Prussia. She took a particular interest
in the published exchanges between Leibniz and Bayle and, it
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seems, Leibniz had given her a copy of an intended reply6 to Bayle’s
latest contribution in the 1702 edition of his Dictionnaire historique
et critique. The author of the Remarques writes that the Queen had
passed him this éclaircissement by Leibniz and asked for his opin-
ion of it. The Remarques is written in the form of a letter to the
Queen and refers to previous discussions with her. It gives Berlin
as the place where it was written and is dated 14 January, 1703.
The first Leibniz knew of this letter was in 1716, when it was
published amongst several items, including that unpublished reply
of his to Bayle, in the Histoire critique. He had good reason to sus-
pect that the author was Toland. The philosophical perspective of
the letter-writer was just that blend of Lockean epistemology and
materialistic metaphysics which had been incorporated in a lost pa-
per of Toland’s against which Leibniz had, on the instruction of the
Queen, written his well-known “Lettre touchant ce qui est inde-
pendent des sens”7. Moreover the letter-writer compared Leibniz
unfavourably with “our celebrated Newton”8 and, picking up on
the reference to “our ... Newton”, Leibniz inferred that the author
was an Englishman9. Moreover Leibniz knew, he admitted to a cor-
respondent, “hardly any other Englishman with whom the Queen
had been able to discuss philosophy”10. 
At the same time there seemed to Leibniz to be strong reasons
for believing that Toland did not write the piece, especially and
conclusively that Toland was no longer in Berlin by January, 1703.
Leibniz knew Toland had passed through Hanover on his way back
to England, via the Netherlands, in late November, 170211. More-
over, since he himself remained in Berlin until February 1703, he
would surely have known about it if Toland (who caused quite a
stir) had been back in the city and in communication with the
Queen12. Scholars since, less well-placed than Leibniz, have under-
s t a n d a b l y h e s i t a t e d t o a t t r i b u t e t h e R e m a rq u e s p o s i t i v e l y t o
Toland. In consequence those interested in expounding Toland’s
ideas have been discouraged from relying on it as they rely on the
Letters to Serena and other works that are part of the full canon of
authentic Toland writings13. Recent scholarship, however, invites us
to consider the Remarques as an integral part of his output in the
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period of the Letters to Serena. Toland himself had indicated in his
Preface to the Letters to Serena that there were further letters to the
Queen of Prussia in addition to the three included in the work
bearing that title14. It is very likely that the Remarques is one of
those further letters for the Queen that already existed in a rough
form15. It underwent some further revision at some hand after
171416. And it has been suggested that Toland himself put finishing
touches to it at this later stage, by which time he might reasonably
be supposed to have been capable of forgetting that it was 1702
and not 1703 that he had received Leibniz’s paper from the Queen
in Berlin17. But internal evidence suggests that it is very substan-
tially the product of the same period of thinking and writing as Let -
ters V.
2. Toland’s reply to his “noble Friend”
The last of the Letters to Serena is entitled “Motion essential to
Matter; in Answer to some Remarks by a noble Friend on the Confu-
tation of Spinosa”. The “Confutation of Spinosa”, published as
Letters IV, had been written to “a Gentleman in Holland”. There
Toland had argued that Spinoza, by failing to give an adequate ac-
count of the nature and cause of motion, had built a system with-
out firm foundations. His “noble Friend” had written in an ap-
proving way of Toland’s critique of Spinoza but had objected to
Toland’s own view that matter is necessarily active as well as ex-
tended. 
It seems that this reference to a “noble Friend” is not merely a
literary device. For Letters V concludes by referring to future dis-
cussions between them and “our common Friend, who alone phi-
losophizes at Court, and who exceeds all the rest in Politeness and
Address, as much as he does in Wisdom and Literature...”1 8. If this
is taken, following Lamarra, as a reference to Leibniz1 9 and the
court is taken therefore to be that of the Queen of Prussia, as seems
most likely2 0, then the “noble Friend” is almost certainly the man
usually referred to in the Leibniz literature as Jakob Heinrich von
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F l e m i n g2 1. This Saxon nobleman – referred to at the Court as a
c o u n t2 2 – visited Berlin with his wife in Autumn, 1702. Moreover he
was involved in discussions with Leibniz and Toland when they ac-
companied the Queen to her retreat in Lützenburg2 3. Flemming
took a critical interest in To l a n d ’s ideas, writing an intervention in
the Leibniz-Toland debate in which he opposed himself to To l a n d ’s
ideas at just the same points as did the “noble friend”. Flemming
thought, according to Leibniz, that “the immaterial is active and
the material passive”, that living things are inferior active beings
(being also material and passive) and that only God is a fully im-
material and active being2 4. We may safely infer that he would have
disagreed entirely with To l a n d ’s claim in the “Confutation of Spin-
osa” that matter is essentially active. On the contrary, Flemming ev-
idently believed in a transcendent immaterial deity who was the
true source of activity in the material world. So he might well have
objected, as the “noble friend” did, that, “after admitting the Activ -
ity of Matter, there seems to be no need of a presiding Intelligence”2 5.
The piece referred to by Leibniz as written by “Monsieur le
comte de Fleming” was evidently not the very one replied to in Let -
ters V26. Nonetheless it establishes Flemming as someone who
wrote philosophical notes opposing Toland at points where he was
also opposed by the “noble Friend”27. Thus there is internal as well
as strong circumstantial evidence for identifying Flemming as the
noble friend who wrote the (now presumably lost) comments on
Toland’s “Confutation of Spinosa” and to whom the last of the Let -
ters to Serena was addressed. 
It seems likely that the “Confutation of Spinosa” was the subject
of discussions at Lützenburg sometime between 27 September and
14 October but that Letters V was not completed until after
Toland’s return to Berlin28. Since, however, Letters V concludes by
anticipating further discussions with the “noble Friend” (Flem-
ming) and “our common Friend” (Leibniz), it is likely to have been
written before Toland left Berlin in mid-November, 17022 9. It
seems a reasonable conjecture, then, that the original (French) let-
ter to the “noble Friend” was written for Flemming sometime be-
tween mid-October and mid-November, 1702.
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3. The priority of the letter to a “noble Friend” 
Leibniz had completed his reply to Bayle and sent it to him by
19 August, 170230. It is likely that he discussed it with the Queen,
who took a particular interest in Bayle, and presumably at some
stage he gave her a copy of it. Toland for his part had arrived at
Lützenburg by the end of July31. Notwithstanding the date (14 Jan-
uary, 1703) which appears at the end of the published letter32, it
seems from the available external evidence as if he wrote the Re -
marques rather earlier, sometime between August and when he left
Berlin in the middle of November, 1702. There is, moreover, inter-
nal evidence which suggests that the Remarques was written later
than the draft of Letters V33. For, as I here argue, it seems that cer-
tain passages were lifted from the letter to the “noble Friend” and
inserted into the Remarques, in which case the latter work would
probably also have been written in the last month of Toland’s visit.
There are several passages in the Remarques which correspond
very closely to passages in Letters V, none more extensively than
where the author presents a critique of the use of abstracted no-
tions in philosophy and, more particularly, of the use of mathemat-
ical abstractions. This is the point where the text of the Remarques
seems, as I argue shortly, to have largely been taken from § 11 of
the other letter. Here is the passage from Letters V, with the bor-
rowings indicated in the footnotes: 
11. I hinted something to you before about the abuse of Words in Phi-
losophy, and we may instance particularly certain Terms invented to
very good purpose by Mathematicians; but misunderstood or pervert-
ed by others, and not seldom very wrongly apply’d by certain Mathe-
maticians themselves34, which can never fail to happen when abstracted
Notions are taken for real Beings35, and then laid down as Principles
whereon to build Hypotheses36. Thus the Mathematical Lines, Surfaces,
and Points have bin maintain’d to exist in reality, and many Conclu-
sions thence deduc’d, tho very unhappily; as that Extention was com-
pounded of Points, which is to say, that Length, Breadth, and Thickness
are form’d of what is neither long, nor broad, nor thick, or Measure of
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no Quantity. So the word Infinite has bin wonderfully perplex’d; which
has given occasion to a thousand Equivocations and Errors. Number
was made infinite; as if it follow’d, because Units may be added to one
another without end, that there actually existed an infinite Number. Of
this nature are infinite Time, the infinite Cogitation of Man, asymptot
Lines, and a great many other boundless Progressions, which are infi-
nite only with respect to the Operations of our Minds, but not so in
themselves. For whatever is really infinite, does actually exist as such;
whereas what only may be infinite, is very positively not so37.
Here now is an English translation of the “corresponding” para-
graph from the Remarques. I have used the language of the author
of Letters to Serena where it corresponds and underlined the pas-
sages which appear to be taken from Letter V:
Allow me to remind you, Madame, of something you have done me the
honour of saying more than once, that of all those who dabble in phi-
losophy, the mathematicians satisfy you the least – especially when they
want to explain the nature of things in general or the nature of the soul
in particular. And you have been surprised that, despite their geometri-
cal exactitude, metaphysical ideas are for most of them a wonderland
[literally “lost country”] and an inexhaustible source of chimeras. That
remark is without doubt very judicious, Madame, and it seems to me
very easy to find the reason for mathematicians having this turn of
mind. When abstracted notions are taken for real beings, or relative
ideas pass for absolute things, it is as if similarities or comparisons are
taken as solid and accurate proofs. Thus certain terms, invented to very
good purpose by mathematicians to focus the imagination38 and the bet-
ter to construct their calculi, have been misunderstood by others. And
they have sometimes been wrongly applied by certain mathematicians ,
who – instead of using them as architects use scaffolds, for the conve-
nience of workmen – have laid them down as fundamental principles
whereon they have built hypotheses. In this way Lines, Surfaces, and
Mathematical Points have bin maintain’d to exist in reality, and many
Conclusions readily deduc’d, such as that Extention was compounded
of mathematical Points, which is to say, that Length, Breadth, and
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Thickness are form’d of what is neither long, nor broad, nor thick, or
Measure of no Quantity. So the word Infinite has bin wonderfully per-
plex’d; which has given occasion to a thousand Equivocations and Er-
rors. Number was made infinite, as if it were something real. And, be-
cause our mind can go on adding Units to one another without end
(putting it crudely), it has been concluded that there actually existed an
infinite Number. Of this nature are infinite Time, the infinite Cogita-
tion of Man, asymptot Lines, and a great many other boundless Pro-
gressions, which are infinite only with respect to the Operations of our
Minds, but not so in themselves. For whatever is really infinite, does ac-
tually exist as such; whereas what only may be infinite, is very positive-
ly not so39. 
It seems clear that either one passage is borrowed from the oth-
er or they are taken from a common source. My suggestion is that
the Remarques passage is a re-use or adaptation of certain passages
in Letters V. More strictly, since French was the language of the
Berlin Court at that time, we must suppose they are derived from a
draft or a copy of the French original. My evidence for this hy-
pothesis is that the passage in Letters V § 11 fits perfectly well into
its context whereas the corresponding passage in the Remarques
does not fit at all well in the context where it appears. This is true
at two levels. At an editorial level the first passage is prepared for
by the preceding sections and in turn prepares the ground for what
follows, suggesting continuity in drafting. This is not so with the
corresponding passage in the Remarques, which is discontinuous
with what comes before and after. At a deeper level the criticism in
Letters V locks onto the target at which it is aimed in a way in which
it fails to do in the Remarques. 
Beginning at the editorial level, the passage appears in Letters V
when there already has been a certain amount of discussion of the
abuse of relative words by their being made absolute – which is in-
deed a major point of that text as a whole. The contrast is drawn
between things which are conceived with respect to ourselves and
things conceived according to their true nature. There is a related
contrast between “mer Comparisons of the Mind” and “the Names
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of ... positive Subjects”40. There has also been discussion of the at-
tempt by philosophers to form an abstract notion of matter with-
out motion.
Toland goes on in § 12 of Letters V to say that no word has been
more misapplied or given more occasion for dispute than the word
“Space”. The misuse is later linked to the misunderstandings of
points, surfaces and lines in mathematics. Because (some) mathe-
maticians made use of the “abstracted notion” of space conceived
as separate from matter, the philosophers 
imagin’d a real Space distinct from Matter, which they held to be ex-
tended, incorporeal, immovable, homogeneal, indivisible, and infinite41.
The mathematician-turned-philosopher whom Toland had partic-
ularly in mind here was Joseph Raphson, an associate of Newton
who had distinguished himself as the author of a work presenting
a method of solving equations42. Further editions of this purely
mathematical work in 1697 and 1702 contained as an annex a
longer work of “mathematical metaphysics” entitled De spatio re -
ali43. Toland refers explicitly to “the ingenious Mr RALPHSON’s [sic]
Book of Real Space” and acknowledges that it is to him that he
“had an eye” in the previous paragraphs44. Raphson does indeed
distinguish between real space and finite extension and stresses the
immovable, indivisible, eternal, incorporeal and all-containing na-
ture of real space45. As Toland notes, Raphson did not claim to be
the first to hold this view46. Nonetheless he seems to have become
for Toland the paradigm of the good mathematician turned bad
philosopher, who is guilty of mistaking abstractions that were of
“singular use to Mathematicians on several occasions” for reali-
ties47. Toland was fully aware that, in opposing absolute space as a
mere abstraction, he would be thought “to have the greatest Man
in the world” against him and he covered himself by saying that it
would not detract from Newton’s standing if he happened to be
mistaken in this matter and that, in any case, Newton might be in-
terpreted as “favourable to my Opinion”48. However that may be,
his criticisms of the mathematical philosophers in Letters V are
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most clearly focussed on Raphson and are response to his book on
“Real Space”. 
At any rate, § 11 fits very well into the context of Letters V as a
whole. By contrast, the corresponding passage of the R e m a rq u e s
does not fit at all well into its context. It is not adequately prepared
f o r. There is no explanation given in that context of the contrasts
between “abstracted notions” and “real beings” or between “rela-
tive ideas” and “absolute things”. The author does not explain how
his diagnosis of the tendency of mathematicians to get lost when
doing metaphysics applies to the case of Leibniz. He did earlier at-
tribute to Leibniz the view that souls are “intelligent points” and,
since points are not real beings for Toland, but mere abstractions,
it is possible that he saw Leibniz’s monadology as based on ab-
s t r a c t i o n4 9. But, instead of following this through, he reverts to his
controversy with the Newtonians on the question of gravity as an
attribute of matter. His rhetoric gives the illusion that his disagree-
ment with Newton is only a minor one whereas his argument im-
plies that Newton himself was an “excellent mathematician” (for
constructing the Inverse Square Law) but a “mediocre philoso-
pher” (for inferring specific gravitational forces in nature). Though
it is clearly Leibniz and not Newton against whom he directed the
jibe that one can be an excellent mathematician but still only a
mediocre philosopher5 0, it is Newton who is To l a n d ’s quarry for the
rest of the letter. Here he is pursuing one aspect of the same theme
as that of Letters V, namely, that we can accept Newton’s physics
without reading these abstract notions (gravity, motion, rest, space
and time, and so on) into the nature of things. In short, Toland was
still pre-occupied with the project of unpicking the mathematics
from the philosophy in Newton’s mathematical philosophy, a pro-
ject which was not pertinent to his critique of Leibniz at all5 1. 
It is not known exactly when Toland wrote the Remarques but
the evidence of “self-plagiarization” puts it later than the original
of Letters V. This means that, if it was written in Berlin, it was writ-
ten before his departure in mid-November, 1702: and, if it was
completed on 14 January, 1703, it was written after his return to
England.
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4. Toland: materialist, theist or what kind of pantheist?
When the two texts are closely examined it becomes apparent
that, where the topics of the two letters overlap, there is a close cor-
respondence in their philosophical content. There are indeed a
number of doctrines common to both papers which are worth ex-
ploring further, including Toland’s critique of abstract notions and
his “instrumentalism”52 about the mathematical sciences, which is
hinted at in the Letters to Serena and more fully developed in the
Remarques. It is the more remarkable, therefore, that the two texts
appear to point in different directions on a topic central to the in-
terpretation of Toland’s thought. The Remarques, so far as it goes,
is a thoroughly materialistic work, which is quite scathing about
“atoms of mind”53. Letters V, by contrast, concludes by appearing
to admit a “presiding Intelligence”, a “pure Spirit” which is re-
sponsible for the order in the Universe. To be sure, the Remarques
does not deny a “presiding Intelligence”, neither does Letters V af-
firm that there are any finite mental substances. But the Remarques
does appear to equate Matter with the one substance and indeed
with reality tout court. And this seems to preclude the existence of
any mental substances whatever, including the “pure Spirit” ap-
parently admitted in Letters V. Contrariwise, if a “pure Spirit” is
admitted as in Letters V, then a comprehensive materialism such as
that of the Remarques must be rejected. 
The last of the so-called Letters to Serena was occasioned, as we
have seen, by objections raised by Flemming to Toland’s philoso-
phy, as it emerged in his “Confutation of Spinosa”. The most grave
objection was that, if we suppose matter to be essentially active,
then we have no need to suppose a “presiding Intelligence”.
Toland replied that the infinity of matter only excluded “an ex-
tended corporeal God, but not a pure Spirit or immaterial Being”.
Indeed, he insisted, such an Intelligence must be supposed if we
are to make sense of the order and organisation of the world:
All the jumbling of Atoms, all the Chances you can suppose for it, cou’d
no more bring the Parts of the Universe into their present Order, nor
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cause the Organization of a Flower or a Fly, than you can imagine that
by tumbling together the Letters of a Printer a million of times, they
should ever fall at last into such a Position, as to make the Æneid of VIR-
GIL, or the Iliad of HOMER, or any other Book in the world54.
Letters V thus appears to stop well short of a thorough-going ma-
terialism by admitting a pure Spirit or Mind who is responsible for
the order in the universe. Toland seems, indeed, to endorse a ver-
sion of the theistic Design Argument.
The Remarques, by contrast, seems to endorse an unqualified
materialism. In it Toland rejects mental substances and aligns him-
self with those who maintain that “matter is the only substance in
the universe”: 
... according to me, substance, reality, or the universe is infinite, and so
what may be called its continuity is never really divided up, conse-
quently there are no independent parts of matter. Particular bodies are
only mentally divided from universal extension by their modifications.
These [modifications] themselves, however, are nothing real but are on-
ly relative to us and our way of thinking about things55.
Toland does not dwell on the point but his equation of the universe
and (the one material) substance with reality (“la Realité”) leaves,
taken strictly, no place for a transcendent God. To be sure, this top-
ic is not squarely addressed in the R e m a rq u e s. Nonetheless
Toland’s statement is, on a plain interpretation, diametrically at
odds with the apparently theistic conclusion of Letters V.
What is to be made of this inconsistency? To answer this ques-
tion we need to bear in mind other remarks by Toland on relevant
topics in this period, both about the nature of mind and about the
existence or otherwise of a deity. We also need to address a tricky
methodological issue central to the interpretation of To l a n d ’s
thought – namely, how to distinguish the “esoteric” philosophy
that most truly reflected his thought from his “exoteric” or “pub-
lic” philosophy, which in some degree at least, did not56.
Taking the second point first, the author of the Letters to Serena,
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despite the at least relative frankness with which he had been able
to state his views in the company of Leibniz, Flemming and the
Queen of Prussia, was clearly already very well aware of the option
available to writers on religious and philosophical questions, of dis-
guising their true beliefs. In one of the earlier letters, we read that 
most of the Philosophers ... had two sorts of Doctrins ... the one private
and the other publick; the latter to be indifferently communicated to all
the World, and the former only very cautiously to their best Friends, or
to some few others capable of receiving it, and that wou’d not make ill
use of the same57.
We are further told that Pythagoras himself did not believe in
the transmigration of souls but held an “internal or secret Doc-
trine” of a materialistic sort. His “external and popular” doctrine
encouraged the mob to believe that “they shou’d become various
kinds of Beasts after Death, thereby to deter ’em more effectually
from Wickedness”. But the italicized words are “equivocal” and
can bear a quite different interpretation. For the “internal or secret
Doctrin” of Pythagoras was:
no more than the eternal Revolution of Forms in Matter, those which
turn every thing into all things, and all things into any thing, as Vegeta-
bles and Animals become part of us, we become part of them...58
A number of interpreters have thought that Toland, who also
made public profession of belief in immortality and who also
thought that the function of such belief in the public mind was to
deter the wrong-doer, was similarly committed to holding quite dif-
ferent views privately5 9. Indeed the views Toland fostered on
Pythagoras as his “secret” doctrine seem to be just such a combi-
nation of the ideas of Lucretius and Bruno as were attractive to the
author of the Letters to Serena. And such views would fit well with
the materialist doctrine of the Remarques.
To understand Toland’s position at this point, however, we need
to bear in mind that by 1702 he had already toyed with two forms
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of what might be called pantheism and indeed was soon (in 1705)
to refer to himself as a “pantheist”60. In the poem Clito (1700) he
floated two pantheistic alternatives to a conventional theistic belief
in a transcendent creator God: one, where God is “the World’s
great Soul” and the other, where God is a whole of which the crea-
tures are parts. As Toland expands on this latter option it becomes
clear that it is a form of materialism and indeed that it would aptly
be described as “pantheistic materialism”:
Or parts the Creatures are, and God the whole
From whence all Beings their existence have,
And into which resolv’d they find a Grave;
How nothing’s lost, though all things change their Form,
As that’s a Fly which is but now a worm;
And Death is only to begin to be
Som other thing, which endless change shall see;
(Then why should men to dy have so great fear?)
Tho nought’s Immortal, all Eternal be61.
The view expressed here is very similar to what Toland was to in-
sinuate in Letters II as the “private philosophy” of Pythagoras.
Everything is eternal since creatures that die are caught up in “the
eternal Revolution of Forms in Matter”. But strictly, and contrary
to Pythagoras’s public teaching, individual souls do not survive and
so, as Toland puts it in Clito, “nought’s Immortal”. God and crea-
tures are not indeed separate individuals but rather “parts the
Creatures are, and God the whole”.
Neither God nor immortality is mentioned in the Remarques.
But Toland there denies the existence of more than one substance
and indeed equates that substance with Matter. There are no
“small indivisible substances” such as Leibniz claimed. Nor are
there even “independent parts of Matter”, our idea of particulars
being purely conventional, they being “nothing real, but only
something relative to us and to our way of conceiving things”62. The
Remarques, taken at face value, embraces a full-bloodied material-
ism. That is consistent with the epiphenomenalist view of mind as
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somehow resulting from matter which Toland defended against
Bayle63. It also fits nicely with the materialistic pantheism floated in
Clito, where God is identified with Matter or with Nature (as com-
monly understood). 
It does not, however, fit with the conclusion of Letters V that
there is a presiding Intelligence which gives the world the order it
has. It is tempting, therefore, once the distinction is drawn between
a public philosophy and a private one, to dismiss that conclusion
of Letters V as only offered for public consumption and not as a
true statement of what Toland really believed. Thus David Berman
has claimed that Letters V has “a logical tendency ... toward mate-
rialistic pantheism”64. Since Berman takes it that “allowing motion
to be essential to matter undermines the most compelling reason
for positing a transcendent cause of the world”, he identifies the
so-called “materialistic pantheism” with the true (secret) philoso-
phy of Toland and the professed belief in an “immaterial presiding
intelligence” as the public philosophy. But Berman mistakes
Toland’s thought. For while Toland does indeed want to posit an
eternal Matter rather than a transcendent cause of a material
world, his arguments for supposing that the order in the world re-
quires a Mind seem to be ones that he accepted himself.
My reason for thinking this is that these are strong arguments
from what can be supposed to be To l a n d ’s point of view. So much
so, indeed, that it is difficult to understand how he himself could be
supposed to be indifferent to their force and resistant to the con-
clusions to which they led. Toland quite correctly points out the log-
ical fault in Flemming’s inference from his belief in the essential ac-
tivity of matter to atheism. God, as he points out, “was able to cre-
ate this Matter active as well as extended”6 5 and so could just as well
have built activity into the material universe in the first place. Hence
belief in an infinite and essentially active universe does not exclude
belief in a creator God. Toland, in short, was not committed to athe-
ism by the arguments of L e t t e r s I V. Moreover, the objection to com-
prehensive materialism – that it cannot explain how the universe
came to have the intricate order it has – was one which atheists at
that time found it particularly difficult to answer6 6. In the absence
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of such a counter-argument available to him but, for reasons of tact,
not deployed in L e t t e r s V, it is a reasonable inference that To l a n d
was himself impressed by the argument he offered Flemming.
There is, therefore, some reason to interpret the position of Let -
ters V as being theistic. It seems clear that it was intended to be tak-
en as such. But, while this is clearly inconsistent with materialistic
pantheism or what more accurately should be called “panhylism”67,
it may fit as well with the other form of pantheism Toland floats in
Clito, where God is identified with “the Soul of the World”.
Toland was later to endorse this view of God as “the Mind, if you
please, and Soul of the Universe”, which he suggested is separated
from the Universe itself only by a distinction of reason68. But this
view is not inconsistent with his view of the eternity of Matter. And
he seems, in the end, to have adopted a dualistic pantheism in
which both the eternity of Mind and the eternity of Matter are rec-
ognized. This is akin to the use of the term “pantheism” as encap-
sulated earlier by Raphson69. Such a dualistic pantheism is ex-
pressed by the epitaph Toland wrote for himself:
Spiritus cum aethero patre,
A quo prodiit olim, conjungitur:
Corpus item, naturae cadens,
In matrem gremio reponitur.
Ipse vero aeternum est resurrecturus,
At item futurus TOLANDUS nunquam70.
From the pantheistic perspective of the later Toland it is possi-
ble to reconcile the materialism of the Remarques with the “pure
Spirit” admitted in Letters V. The father/mother duality retains the
denial of finite individual substances, whether mental or material,
which is a prominent feature of the Remarques. It retains the denial
of immortality (at any rate as involving the retention of individual
personal identity) which is a corollary of the denial of finite indi-
vidual substances. At the same time the “etherial father” (the Soul
of the Universe) is co-eternal with mother Nature71. Thus room is
left for the “pure Spirit” of Letters V, interpreted in a pantheistic
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rather than a theistic way. Hence, although Toland’s profession of
belief in a “pure Spirit” responsible for the order in the world is in-
deed to be interpreted in terms of his double philosophy, we do not
need to suppose that he was merely lying in his teeth. It seems, in-
deed, to have been contrary to his principles to do that72. He was in
truth admitting a “pure Spirit” even although he was not disclos-
ing his heterodox views about the immanence of this Spirit in the
world. 
However, even if the two letters can be reconciled from the per-
spective of the dualistic pantheism adopted by the later Toland,
that is not sufficient reason of itself to interpret the earlier Toland
in that way. Neither is there, so far as I know, direct evidence from
Toland’s writings to confirm that he held such a view as early as
1702. Nonetheless there is circumstantial evidence in a paper Leib-
niz wrote during the time of his debates with Toland in 1702, his
“Considerations sur a doctrine d’un Esprit Universal Unique”73.
Though directed against a wide range of views, ancient and mod-
ern, this paper is at a number of points relevant to Leibniz’s de-
bates with Toland, suggesting, as it does, reasons why some (like
Toland) were tempted to deny the existence of “particular souls”
and blaming those who believed in the false doctrine of souls sep-
arated from bodies for driving people to believe in a single univer-
sal spirit74. Leibniz goes on to consider the consequences of the
view that “there is nothing in nature but the universal spirit and
matter”75. Though Toland is not mentioned it seems very probable
that Leibniz had him in mind at this point. If so, then this is some
evidence that Toland was already committed to the kind of dualis-
tic pantheism on the basis of which the apparent conflict between
the pure Spirit admitted in Letters V and the eternal Matter of the
Remarques can be reconciled.
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N O T E S
1 Papers written for the Queen that survive include the first three of Toland’s Let -
ters to Serena, Leibniz’s well-known Lettre sur ce qui passe les sens et la matière
(KLOPP X, p. 147 ff.), Toland’s reply (KLOPP, X, pp. 167-177) and Leibniz’s re-
joinder (KLOPP, X , p. 178 ff.). Other manuscripts include, as I bring out here, the
originals of the last two of the Letters to Serena. Several other manuscripts that had
some circulation in this circle are referred to in the course of this paper, including
some lost papers by Toland and a paper by Leibniz that has not yet been put in its
proper context. 
2 The title is REMARQUES CRITIQUES sur le Systême de Monsr. Leibnitz de l’Harmonie
préetablie; où l’on recherche en passant pourquoi les Systêmes Metaphysiques des
Mathematiciens ont moins de clarté, que ceux des autres: écrites par ordre de Sa MA -
JESTÉ la feuë REINE DE PRUSSE”. It was published in the Histoire critique de la
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république des lettres..., XI, 1716, pp. 116-128. References to this letter here are to
“Histoire critique, XI” followed by the appropriate page number.
3 For instance, it is omitted from the bibliography of Toland’s works appended to
the 1997 edition of Christianity not Mysterious: Text, Associated Works and Criti -
cal Essays, eds PH I L I P MCGU I N N E S S, AL A N HA R R I S O N & RI C H A R D KE A R N E Y,
Dublin, Lilliput Press, 1997. That is noteworthy since these editors are critical of
other recent scholars who are too inclusive and are even doubtful whether Toland
“wrote much of what they list” (Christianity, p. 329). GIANCARLO CARABELLI, in his
Tolandiana: Materiali bibliografici per lo studio dell’opera e della fortuna di John
Toland (1670-1722), Florence, La Nuova Italia, 1975, includes the Remarques and
reflects the then state of scholarly opinion by listing secondary literature in which
it is attributed to Toland “dubitativamente” (p. 195). 
4 This was first etablished by ANTONIO LAMARRA in An Anonymous Criticism from
Berlin to Leibniz’s Philosophy: John Toland against Mathematical Abstractions,
“Studia Leibnitiana”,Sonderheft16, 1990, pp. 89-102. See also R. S. WOOLHOUSE,
John Toland and “Remarques critiques sur le systême de Monsr. Leibnitz de l’har -
monie préétablie”, “Leibniz Society Review”, VIII, 1998, pp. 80-87. Some of the
evidence of connections I discuss here between the two papers could be used to
further strengthen the case Lamarra has already made. But since I agree that, on
the basis of his arguments, LAMARRA is entitled to conclude that Toland’s author-
ship of the Remarques is, as he claims, “reasonably proved” (op. cit., p. 100), I have
taken that as a starting-point. Rather than continue the argument about authorship
I have concerned myself with some implications and consequential questions that
follow once the question of authorship is taken as settled. 
5 This letter is entitled Motion essential to Matter; in Answer to some Remarks by a
Noble Friend on the Confutation of Spinosa”. It was published as Letter V of the
Letters to Serena (1704). References to it here will be to Letters V followed, where
appropriate, by the section number and the page number of the original edition. 
6 The Leibniz piece was his Réponse de M. Leibniz aux reflexions contenues dans la
seconde édition du Dictionnaire Critique de M. Bayle, article Rorarius, sur le systême
de l’harmonie préétablie. Leibniz told Bayle that he had written it for him and for
“certain selected friends” (GERHARDT, III, p. 63 f.) rather than for the public. It
was not published until submitted, together with Toland’s critique and other
pieces, by Pierre Desmaizeaux to the Histoire critique, XI, pp 78-114. Leibniz’s pa-
per is translated into English in WOOLHOUSE & FRANCKS, pp. 107-126 . A slightly
different text was published in GERHARDT, IV, pp. 554-571 and translated in
LOEMKER, pp. 575-585, where 1702 is mistakenly given as the date of publication. 
7 GERHARDT, VI, pp. 499-508.
8 Histoire critique, XI, p. 131.
9 In letters to Bayle Leibniz refers to Toland as “the learned Englishman who
brought me your kind regards” (GERHARDT, III, p. 68 and 70). That this is a refer-
ence to Toland seems clear from the fact that the person referred to had sent a dis-
cussion note to Bayle regarding the entry in his Dictionnaire historique et critique
on Dicaearchus, claiming that matter can be made to think. Since Toland had been
introduced to him as part of an English diplomatic mission, it would have been
natural for Leibniz to assume, as he wrongly did, that Toland was an Englishman.
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10 The evidence of Leibniz’s reaction to the publication of the Remarques is in a let-
ter he wrote to the court librarian in Berlin, Mathurin La Croze, on 9 October,
1716 (DUTENS, V, p. 518). La Croze was also a member of Sophie Charlotte’s cir-
cle. 
11 See, e.g., GERHARDT, III, p. 68.
12 Müller and Krönert’s chronology has Leibniz out of Berlin for part of October,
1702 and again in February, 1703, but in residence there for the whole of the pe-
riod November through January (MÜLLER & KRÖNERT, pp. 181-183). 
13 See note (3) above for evidence of recent scholarly opinion. Examples of recent
scholars who think it is probable that Toland did write the Remarques but who
make nothing of it when giving an account of his ideas or his relation to Leibniz
are CHIARA GIUNTINI in her Panteismo e ideologia repubblicana: John Toland
(1670-1722), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1979, p. 162 and ROBERT E. SULLIVAN in his John
Toland and the deist Controversy, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press,
1982, ch. 6. 
14 Letters, Preface, §§ 4 and 24. He gave as his reason for not including them was that
he did not have fair copies. The other two “philosophical letters” he included in-
stead were written respectively to “a Gentleman in Holland” and “a noble
Friend”.
15 WOOLHOUSE suggests (op. cit., p. 83) that one of the others may have been the now
lost piece on the theology of the Egyptians. There is also Toland’s reply to Leib-
niz’s letter on the origin of our ideas (KLOPP, X, pp. 167-177; GERHARDT, VI, pp.
509-514).
16 There was a footnote reference to a review of one of Berkeley’s books that had ap-
peared in the Histoire critique in 1714. This reference, I believe, was most proba-
bly added by the editor of the journal. 
17 This is LAMARRA’s view (op. cit. , p. 96). Another possibility is that the date was
added by someone else, such as Pierre Desmaizeaux, who was responsible for
sending it for publication, perhaps because, lacking a date (as Toland’s copy may
have done), it might have appeared less like a proper letter.
18 Letters V § 31, p. 238.
19 I am indebted to LAMARRA’s paper for drawing my attention to this “unmistakable
reference” (op. cit., p. 102) to Leibniz. It seems likely that Leibniz is also the “wor-
thy friend” ( Letters V § 1, p. 164) to whom the letter praising and raising objec-
tions to the “Confutation” was written.
20 To suppose that it was some other court or a merely fictitious court would bring
in doubt the identification of Serena with the Queen of Prussia, on which Toland
scholars are agreed. Toland himself insisted Serena was “a very real Person” (L e t -
t e r s, Preface § 9), though he would only reveal that she was “Wife to a Man of con-
spicuous dignity” (L e t t e r s, Preface § 4). The identification is, I believe, clinched
by the testimony of Jacques Lenfant, who was present when Toland gave, in the
presence of the Queen, a paper “On Prejudices” which surely was at least a ver-
sion of the first of his Letters to Serena. See Bibliothèque germanique ou histoire
litéraire de l’Allemagne, de la Suisse, et des Pays du Nord, Amsterdam, 1723, vol.
VI, p. 51.
21 There is a substantial entry on Jakub Henryk Flemming (1667-1728) in the Polski
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Slownik Biograficzny (Kraków, 1948), vol. VII, pp. 32-34. Flemming was part of
the entourage of the Elector of Saxony, who had become King of Poland in 1697.
22 Leibniz referred to him in his letters to the Electress Sophia as “Monsieur le comte
de Fleming”. Sophie Charlotte, writing to her mother, referred to him sometimes
as “comte Fleming” though usually just as “Fleming”. 
23 Owing to the improbable fact that there were two military Heinrich von Flemings
associated with the Queen’s circle at this time, they have been systematically con-
fused by editors of the available texts, including Klopp (whose index conflates
them) and Gerhardt (see GERHARDT, VI, p. 520). In consequence, some of editors
of key Leibniz reference works, including E. BODEMANN (in Der Briefweschel des
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz..., Hanover, Hahn, 1895, p. 58) confuse them. MÜLLER
AND KRÖNERT (in MÜLLER & KRÖNERT, p. 181) are confused about which von
Fleming was involved in the discussions with Toland. Heinrich Heino (d. 1706)
was an “old friend” of Leibniz’s – much admired by the Queen – who lived in re-
tirement in a castle (Buckow) near Berlin. Jakob Heinrich (d. 1728) was new to the
court in September, 1702, when the daughter of the other von Fleming was pre-
sent, providing Leibniz with the occasion in one of his regular letters to the Elec-
tress Sophia to give an authoritative clarification (KLOPP, VIII, p. 370). In his let-
ters Leibniz refers to the senior von Fleming as “Feldmareschal” and to the
younger man as “Monsieur le comte de Fleming”. It was the visiting Saxon count
who, on Leibniz’s account, was involved in the discussions with Toland and it is
he therefore (and not the Prussian Fieldmarshal) who is the “noble Friend” to
whom Letters V is addressed. 
24 KLOPP, VIII, p. 396, quoted in GERHARDT, VI, p. 521.
25 Letters V § 30, p. 234. The italicized words appear to be a quotation from the let-
ter of the “noble Friend”. 
26 It seems to have been occasioned by reading a contribution by Leibniz to his de-
bates with Toland (KLOPP, VIII, p. 396).
27 Toland describes his correspondent as “no less illustrious for his excellent Learn-
ing than his noble Family” (Letters, Preface). Flemming’s interest in Spinoza, like
Toland’s, may have derived from the time he spent as a student in the Netherlands. 
28 I infer this from the fact that Leibniz was party to the discussions, Flemming hav-
ing communicated his objections to Toland’s “Confutation” first to Leibniz. It is
uncertain whether Leibniz saw Toland’s letter to the noble friend prior to its pub-
lication, though there is a curious reference in a 1704 letter to Toland’s forthcom-
ing “dialogues” (GERHARDT, III, p. 299). Leibniz’s description of these as about
Toland’s claim that matter contains essentially the principle of movement within
itself seems like a Leibnizian paraphrase of the title of Letters V, which he may then
have been remembering. Though the claim is also made in Letters IV, the way Let -
ters V quotes and replies to Flemming’s objections suggests the dialogue form
Leibniz himself was adopting in relation to Locke. Even if Letters V was sent di -
rectly to Flemming, Leibniz may have known of its existence as a reply to Flem-
ming’s objections. Leibniz and Toland were on separate journeys out of Berlin in
late October (DOEBNER, p. 22) and seemed to have less to do with one another to-
wards the end of Toland’s stay. 
29 He took his leave of the Queen on 11 November, 1702 (DOEBNER, p. 23), and re-
T W O P A P E R S B Y J O H N T O L A N D
75
Brown, Stuart (1999) Two papers by John Toland. I Castelli di Yale, IV (4). pp. 55-79. ISSN 1591-2353
turned to Holland via Hanover, though without seeing the Electress (KLOPP, X, p.
402), who had resolved reluctantly to accept the advice not to allow him to be as-
sociated with her. 
30 See GERHARDT, III, pp. 62-63; WOOLHOUSE & FRANCKS, p. 70.
31 The arrival of “le fameux Toland” was eagerly anticipated by Sophie Charlotte,
who was able to tell her mother, in a letter from Lützenburg dated 29 July, that he
had finally presented himself (DOEBNER, p. 16). 
32 It seems that anyone who holds that the Remarques was written by Toland must
reject either the date or the Berlin address for the completion of the letter, or both.
I am inclined to think, like Lamarra, that it is the date is wrong. But the fact is that
we have no firm independent evidence that the Queen either commissioned or re-
ceived Toland’s Remarques. There are a number of possible explanations of why
he might still have been working on it in 1703. 
33 I differ from LAMARRA mainly in thinking that the Remarques was produced after,
and incorporated passages from, the paper on “Motion as essential to Matter”.
Lamarra’s view was that “there does not seem to be sufficient evidence to support
a hypothesis” about how the two texts “relate to each other chronologically” (op.
cit., p. 101).
34 “... certain termes, inventés fort à propos par les Mathematiciens, <pour fixer
l’imagination, & pour mieux former les Calculs, > ont été souvent mal entendus
par d’autres; & quelquefois même mal appliqués par certains Mathematiciens...”
(Histoire critique, XI, p. 129).
35 “Quand des notions abstraites sont prises pour des Etres réels...” (ibid.)
36 “... les on posés comme autant de principes <fondamentaux>, sur lesquels ils ont
ensuite bâti des hypothèses” (ibid.)
37 “De cette maniere on a soutenu, que les lignes, les surfaces, & les points Mathema -
tiques, existoient réellement dans la nature; & de là on a tiré bien des conclusions;
entre autres celle-ci, que l’Etendue étoit composée de points Mathematiques; ce qui
est dire, que la longeur la largeur, & la profoundeur, sont formées de ce qui n’est
ni long, ni large, ni profond; ou que la mesure resulte de ce qui n’est pas une quan-
tité. De même, le term d’Infini a été étrangement brouillé; ce qui a causé mille er-
reurs & equivoques. Le nombre a été censé infini, comme s’il étoit quelque chose
de réel; & parce que nôtre Esprit peut faire une addition d’Unités sans bornes, (vul-
gairement parlant) on a conclu qu’il existoit actuellement un nombre infini. Il en
est de même du temps infini , de la pensée infinie, des lignes asymptotes, & d’un
grand nombre d’autres progressions à l’infini; lesquelles sont infinies à la verité par
rapport aux operations de nôtre entendement, mais non pas en elles mêmes: car
tout ce qui est naturellement inifini, est actuellement tel; & ce qui peut seulement
être infini, ne l’est asseurément point du-tout (Histoire critique, XI, pp. 129-30).
38 There is a corresponding discussion of the abuse of words in Letters V § 7, where
Toland writes: “A world of other words are invented to help our Imagination, like
Scaffolds for the Convenience of the Workmen; but which must be laid aside when
the Building is finish’d, and not be mistaken for the Pillars or Foundation” (p.
174). 
39 Histoire critique, XI, p. 129 f.
40 Letters V § 7, p. 174.
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41 Letters V § 12, p. 18.
42 The work was his Analysis aequationum universalis (1690) and the method is
known as “the Newton-Raphson method”. Raphson was made an F. R. S. on the
strength of this work.
43 The full title of this work is De spatio reali seu Ente infinito conamen mathematico-
metaphysicum. The otherwise good entry on Raphson in The Dictionary of Eigh -
teenth-Century British Philosophers (Bristol, Thoemmes, 1999), apparently follow-
ing COPENHAVER (cited in note 46 below), mistakenly implies that the work was
not published before 1702.
44 The reference is in Letters V § 26, p. 219 and seems to be to §§ 24 ff., where Toland
is concerned to expose “the most universal mistake” proceeding from belief in the
inactivity of matter as “the Notion of an infinite, extended, yet incorporeal Space”.
45 The properties of absolute space Raphson claims to demonstrate in chapters 4 and
5 of his book are almost but not quite identical with the list Toland gives (Letters
V § 24, p. 214). Moreover RAPHSON holds that space is an attribute of the first
cause (De Spatio Reali, prop. 13 a, p. 79) and is not far from holding the views
Toland ridicules in Letters V § 26, p. 219 f.
46 He acknowledges amongst his predecessors some Cabbalistic philosophers and es-
pecially Henry More, whose theory of space was strongly influenced by the Cab-
balists and which in turn influenced that of Newton, a connection Raphson
(though not, of course, Toland) was happy to make something of. See BRIAN
COPENHAVER, Jewish Theologies of Space in the Scientific Revolution: Henry More,
Joseph Raphson, “Annals of Science”, XXXVII, 1980, pp. 489-548.
47 Letters V § 26, p. 218. The reference to Raphson’s De spatio reali is on the follow-
ing page. 
48 Letters V § 13, p. 183 f. 
49 See Histoire critique, XI, p. 123 f. Leibniz did make some analogy between souls
and mathematical points, but only to support his claim that every soul is different
from every other.
50 Histoire critique, XI, p. 131.
51 There is not space to argue the point here, but my opinion is that Toland mistak-
enly supposed that Leibniz was cast in the same philosophical mould as Raphson
and so accused him of being a Cabbalistic metaphysicial who believed in absolute
incorporeal space and denied the reality of matter.
52 By “instrumentalism” I mean the doctrine (or any of a set of doctrines) according
to which the mathematical sciences (including physics and astronomy) need to
make use of certain notions in their theoretical apparatus but according to which
these notions are mere “instruments” and should not be supposed to represent
anything in reality. Toland’s programme of re-interpreting Newton so as to avoid
being committed to absolute space or gravity as essential to matter puts him in
company, not only with Leibniz but with his younger compatriot Berkeley.
53 Toland used this phrase as if he were quoting Leibniz but it does not appear in the
Leibniz paper. It reflects Toland’s mistaken view that Leibniz believed in disem-
bodied minds.
54 Letters V § 30, p. 235 f .
55 Histoire critique, XI, p. 124.
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56 There is a considerable debate in the literature, which I cannot join here, about
the exact nature and purpose of this distinction. Writings on these topics I have
found particularly helpful and, on important points persuasive, include DA V I D
BE R M A N, Deism, Immortality, and the Art of Theological Lying, in J. A. LE O
LE M A Y, ed., Deism, Masonry, and the Enlightenment, Newark, University of
Delaware Press, 1987; JU S T I N CH A M P I O N, John Toland and the Politics of Panthe -
i s m, “Revue de synthèse”, 116, no. 2-3, 1995, pp. 259-280 and PI E R R E LU R B E, C l i -
dophorus et la question de la double philosophie, “Revue de synthèse”, 116, no. 2-
3, 1995, pp. 379-398.
57 Letters II § 14, p. 56 f.
58 Letters II § 14, p. 57.
59 See, for instance, DAVID BERMAN’s Deism, Immortality, and the Art of Theological
Lying, previously cited.
60 Socinianism truly Stated... , a book usually attributed to Toland, included another
work “Indifference in Disputes” recommended by a “Pantheist”. It seems clear, as
JUSTIN CHAMPION has argued (op. cit. ) that “pantheism” had practical connota-
tions for Toland. And these may even have become more important for him in his
later writings. Nonetheless the choice of the term indicates that it also had a meta-
physical content. 
61 Clito (1700), p. 8 f.
62 Histoire critique, XI, p. 124.
63 Leibniz gave some account of this in a letter of November, 1702. See GERHARDT,
III, p. 68; WOOLHOUSE & FRANCKS, p. 128 f.
64 In his essay The Irish Freethinker, Christianity, p. 227.
65 Letters V § 30, p. 234.
66 Arguably, it is only in the last hundred years or so that it has been possible to tell
a plausible atheistic story about the chance evolution of highly organized living
things. 
67 As STEPHEN DANIEL points out (Christianity, p. 306). Daniel, following Raphson,
dismisses it is mere atheism but the way Toland writes about this option in Clito
invites a more religious designation. 
68 Pantheisticon (1720, English transl. 1751), pp. 17-18.
69 RAPHSON defined “pantheism” as “a certain universal substance, material as well
as intelligent, that fashions all things that exist out of its own essence” (De spatio
reali, p. 2). Toland is likely to have been aware of this earlier use and may indeed
have simply been following that use himself. Even if Toland was the first writer to
use the word in an English publication, he cannot be credited, as he often has been,
with inventing it. 
70 “His spirit was joined with its etherial father/ from whom it had once proceeded;
his body likewise yielding to Nature,/ to be again laid in the lap of its mother: he
is about to be resurrected eternally,/ and yet he will never be the same Toland
again” (Quoted and transl. from Some Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Mr
Toland, 1722).
71 Such eternal life as individuals can hope for has to do with their being part of
something eternal.
72 “Not plainly to say and profess all you think, or to do it by circumlocution and fig-
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ures, is one thing: but it is quite another thing, to speak positively against your own
judgement ...” (Tetradymus, 1720, p. 81). 
73 The manuscript of this paper contains the note by Leibniz: “1702: à Luzenbourg
prés de Berlin” (see GERHARDT, VI, p. 529 n.) It alludes to another paper written
in response to Toland, at the Queen’s behest, on what is independent of sense and
matter. Its “popular” style, the date and place of its writing, and its religious con-
tent all suggest that it belongs to the same sequence of discussions. 
74 LOEMKER, p. 555 ff.; GERHARDT, VI, p. 531 ff.
75 LOEMKER, p. 559; GERHARDT, VI, p. 537.
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